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Making Up for Lost Educational
Opportunities
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN COMPENSATORY
EDUCATION AND ADDITIONAL SERVICES AS
REMEDIES UNDER THE IDEA
INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1
provides that students with disabilities are entitled to a free
appropriate public education (FAPE).2 One of the original
purposes of the IDEA was to reduce parents’ reliance on the
judicial system to obtain relief for children with disabilities
who have been denied a FAPE.3 Despite the intentions of
1

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006). The IDEA was originally named the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act. See Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. In 1990, Congress revised and
amended the Act, renaming it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476,
§ 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42. In 2004, the Act was amended and reauthorized as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act. See Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, § 1, 118 Stat. 2647,
2647. Given the various amendments and name changes over the years, the IDEA is
often referred to as the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA); the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA); Public Law 94-142; the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act (IDEIA). See THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW 3 (3d ed. 2008) (tracing the name changes of the Act). For the sake of
clarity, this note will use either “IDEA” or “the Act” when referring to the Act, except
when discussing the history of the Act.
2
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
3
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433.
In 1975, the Senate Committee expressed its intention of providing a guarantee of
equal educational opportunity, reducing parents’ reliance on the judicial system:
[P]arents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their children
are being denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It
should not, however, be necessary for parents throughout the country to
continue utilizing the courts to assure themselves a remedy. It is this
Committee’s belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its
responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped
children are provided equal educational opportunity. It can no longer be the
policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring
all children to be in school.
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Congress, tensions between parents and school districts have
grown over the last thirty-five years, with both parties resorting
to the courts for clarification of the IDEA’s mandates.4
A primary source of IDEA litigation has been the
continuing confusion over what constitutes an “appropriate”
remedy for the denial of a FAPE.5 The IDEA did not originally
clarify what relief is available to remedy a denial of a FAPE,
stating simply that courts can grant “such relief as the court
determines is appropriate.”6 While courts initially interpreted
the word appropriate narrowly, the range of available remedies
expanded in recent years.7 In its amendments to the IDEA,
Congress codified and clarified some of the judicially created
remedies, such as tuition reimbursement.8 However, Congress
has not clarified whether compensatory educational services
are appropriate remedies under the IDEA, leaving the issue for
the courts to decide.9
The lower courts, lacking clarification from Congress
and the Supreme Court, have struggled to outline the contours
of compensatory educational services as remedies for denials of
FAPE, resulting in a confusing body of jurisprudence.10 Courts
do not agree on the availability of the remedy,11 and the circuits
Id. The amount of litigation surrounding the IDEA has been a continuing concern of
Congress and later amendments have attempted to address the problem. See Tara L.
Eyer, Comment, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the
Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 103 DICK. L. REV. 613, 626-27
(1999).
4
Alison Leigh Cowan, Amid Affluence, a Struggle over Special Education,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, § 1, at 37, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/24/
education/24westport.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1%22%20costs&sq&st=cse%22special%
20education&scp=3.
5
See CHARLES J. RUSSO & ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS &
SCHOOL-BASED CASES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 233 (2008).
6
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
7
See MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 294 (1998)
(explaining that the definition of “appropriate relief” has expanded to include not only
injunctive remedies, but also other remedies such as tuition reimbursement and
compensatory education).
8
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (outlining the tuition reimbursement
remedy); RUSSO & OSBORNE, JR., supra note 5, at 233; see also infra Part III.A.
9
See generally GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 235-37 (tracing the
history of compensatory education).
10
See James Schwellenbach, Comment, Mixed Messages: An Analysis of the
Conflicting Standards Used by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals When
Awarding Compensatory Education for a Violation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 53 ME. L. REV. 245, 266-79 (2001) (examining the different standards
used by the circuit courts in compensatory education cases).
11
Compare Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860, 868-69
(D.N.H. 1992) (finding that compensatory education can only be awarded to students
who are over twenty-one or otherwise ineligible for services under the IDEA), with
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have developed different standards for addressing compensatory
education awards.12 Further complicating the issue is the
ongoing uncertainty surrounding what standard the courts
should apply to determine whether a student has been denied a
FAPE and is therefore entitled to compensatory educational
services.13 Central to this confusion is the issue of whether
compensatory education should be available to students who
are no longer protected by the IDEA because they have
graduated or turned twenty-one years of age.14
In theory, compensatory educational services remedies
can be divided into two distinct categories: (1) “compensatory
education” and (2) “additional services.”15 While the two
remedies are similar, there are significant differences between
them, especially regarding the legal standards that should be
applied to each. On the one hand, “compensatory education” is
an exceptional remedy that requires a school district to fund a
child’s education even after the child is no longer protected by
the IDEA because she has either graduated or reached the age
of twenty-one.16 “Additional services,” on the other hand, can
only be awarded as a remedy to students who are still eligible for
instruction under the IDEA, but have been improperly denied
services.17 Courts tend to lump both remedies together under the
“compensatory education” title.18 However, this note argues that
the two remedies should be treated differently, and different

Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 4890440, at *24
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (finding that compensatory education can be awarded to
students both under and over twenty-one years old).
12
See Schwellenbach, supra note 10, at 266-79.
13
See generally David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a School’s
Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a
Free and Appropriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 87-96 (2010)
(comparing the “materiality” standard with the per se approach); Dixie Snow Huefner,
Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 373-77 (2008)
(advocating for an updated FAPE standard).
14
See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 237.
15
Impartial Hearing Officers (IHO) in New York treat the two compensatory
remedies distinctly, following the reasoning of the New York Office of State Review.
See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf
(distinguishing compensatory education from additional services).
16
Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).
17
Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf.
18
See, e.g., Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL
4890440, at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (referring to the remedy as “compensatory
education” when in reality the court was awarding “additional services”).
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standards should be used to evaluate cases contemplating each
type of relief.
The difference between the two remedies is especially
important in the Second Circuit, where the court has traditionally
applied a strict “gross violation” standard to compensatory
education cases.19 In Student X v. New York City Department of
Education, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York awarded a compensatory remedy to a
student who was still qualified for protection under the IDEA
without deciding whether the “gross violation” standard applied
outside the context of compensatory education awards.20 Whether
the “gross violation” standard applies to additional services cases
is still an open question in the Second Circuit.21
Part I of this note explores the background and history
of the IDEA, as well as the IDEA’s requirements for school
districts. Part II examines the standards courts employ to
determine whether a student has been denied a FAPE, arguing
that courts should apply different standards depending on
whether they are awarding compensatory education or
additional services. In the context of additional services awards,
part II advocates for the adoption of a standard that better
reflects recent amendments to the IDEA. Part III considers the
development of both types of compensatory remedies—
“compensatory education” and “additional services”—in detail.
Finally, part IV uses the Second Circuit’s “gross violation”
standard to illustrate the confusion that stems from the current
application of the IDEA and proposes solutions to help courts
craft better compensatory remedies.
I.

BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE IDEA

Much of the confusion surrounding the applicable legal
standards for compensatory educational services awards
originates from the maturation of the IDEA’s goals and

19

See, e.g., Mrs. C v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23-24 (finding that the student was
entitled to a compensatory remedy and that regardless of whether the gross violation
standard applied, it had been satisfied).
21
See id. at *24-25. The “gross violation” standard has not been adopted by
any of the other federal circuit courts. See Schwellenbach, supra note 10, at 266-79
(examining the different standards used by each circuit court in compensatory
education cases).
20
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purposes,22 as well as the evolving nature of the remedies
available under the IDEA.23 The history of the IDEA provides
the necessary context for understanding the source of judicial
confusion regarding these remedies, while the IDEA’s
requirements supply the essential framework for addressing
why these two forms of relief should be treated distinctly.
A.

History and Overview of the IDEA

By the beginning of the twentieth century, most states
had compulsory school attendance laws, yet many states—
either by court decree or statute—allowed for the exclusion of
students with disabilities.24 Special education students, viewed
as a disruptive influence in the classroom, were often
segregated from the general education population.25 The
prevailing view at the time was that students with disabilities
“were unable to reap the benefits of a good education.”26
The educational prospects for children with disabilities
improved significantly with the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.27 In Brown, the Supreme
Court stressed the importance of providing a public education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.28

22

See, e.g., Huefner, supra note 13, at 369-77 (tracing some of the important
amendments to the IDEA).
23
See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 235-37; see also infra Part III.
24
See generally YELL, supra note 7, at 54-55 (discussing compulsory
attendance and the exclusion of students with disabilities).
25
LAURA ROTHSTEIN & SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 9 (4th
ed. 2010).
26
YELL, supra note 7, at 54-55.
27
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28
Id. at 493.
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This reasoning from Brown formed an important basis for later
cases that were brought on behalf of students with
disabilities.29 In both Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Citizens (PARC) v. Pennsylvania30 and Mills v. Board of
Education,31 the federal courts relied partially on Brown to
establish that students with disabilities are entitled to a free
public education and that this right should be protected by
procedural safeguards.32 In turn, the principles established in
PARC and Mills were largely incorporated by Congress in the
passing of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA) in 1975.33
Prior to the enactment of the EAHCA, the precursor to
the IDEA, Congress determined that the needs of students
with disabilities were not being met.34 Specifically, Congress
realized that many special education students were not being
properly identified and diagnosed by schools, were not
receiving appropriate educational interventions, and were often
unnecessarily alienated from their peers.35 To address these
problems, Congress enacted the Act to guarantee that special
29

See YELL, supra note 7, at 59.
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In PARC, the state of Pennsylvania
entered into a consent agreement to provide all students with intellectual disabilities
between the ages of six and twenty-one a “free public program of education and
training appropriate to [the students’] learning capabilities.” Id. at 302. The consent
agreement also provided parents of students with intellectual disabilities procedural
protections, such as notice and the right to a hearing. Id. at 303.
31
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). In Mills, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia ordered the school district to provide students with
disabilities “a free and suitable publicly-supported education.” Id. at 878. The Mills
court set forth detailed due process hearing procedures the school district was required
to implement and follow. Id. at 879-83.
32
See YELL, supra note 7, at 59-60 (discussing the importance of Brown to
later cases brought on behalf of students with disabilities); see also H. RUTHERFORD
TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW AND CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES 30 (3d ed. 1990) (“Although Brown established the right to an equal
educational opportunity based upon Fourteenth Amendment grounds, it was not until
[PARC] v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Mills v. D.C. Board of Education that
Brown became meaningful for handicapped children.”).
33
See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94142, 89 Stat. 773; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 193-94 (1982)
(examining the legislative history of the Act). The purpose of the EAHCA was to
provide students with disabilities access to a FAPE. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(c), 89
Stat. 773, 775 (1975). The Supreme Court initially interpreted the original version of
the Act as providing a “basic floor of opportunity.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
34
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006).
35
See id.; see also Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, a Dollar: Section 1983
Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV. 465, 472-73 (2002)
(examining Congress’s findings that students with disabilities were being excluded
from school or otherwise not being provided with an appropriate education).
30
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education students would receive an appropriate education to
meet their unique needs.36
The IDEA’s primary purpose was to address the needs
of millions of students with disabilities by ensuring their access
to a “free appropriate public education.”37 The underlying policy
of the Act is expressly stated in the statute:
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way
diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to
society. Improving educational results for children with disabilities
is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.38

The purpose of the IDEA is not only to protect the
educational rights of students with disabilities, but also to
assist state and local agencies in providing appropriate
education for this population of students.39 Thus, the IDEA is
intended to ensure that states provide early intervention
programs to identify students with disabilities so that their
individual needs can be properly addressed at an early age.40
Unlike other legislation to protect persons with
disabilities, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the IDEA, largely a funding statute, is unique in its application
to the states.41 While the ADA applies to schools regardless of
whether they accept federal funding, the IDEA provides
additional federal funds to states that conform to the rules and
policies of the Act.42 Unlike the ADA, the IDEA “is couched in
the language of specific positive education rights, rather than
that of nondiscrimination.”43 The substantive right conferred by
the IDEA is access to a FAPE, in the least restrictive
36

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
Id. § 1400(c)(2).
38
Id. § 1400(c)(1).
39
Id. § 1400(d).
40
Id.
41
See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 9.
42
20 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each State that receives funds under this chapter
shall—(1) ensure that any State rules, regulations, and policies relating to this chapter
conform to the purposes of this chapter; (2) identify in writing to local educational
agencies located in the State and the Secretary any such rule, regulation, or policy as a
State-imposed requirement that is not required by this chapter and Federal regulations;
and (3) minimize the number of rules, regulations, and policies to which the local
educational agencies and schools located in the State are subject under this chapter.”).
43
Lynn M. Daggett, Perry A. Zirkel & LeeAnn L. Gurysh, For Whom the
School Bell Tolls but Not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 727 (2005).
37
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environment (LRE), that is specially tailored to meet the
individual needs of a student.44 While states have the option to
accept funding under the IDEA, and thereby agree to be bound
by its requirements, every state has opted to do so.45
B.

Requirements of the IDEA

The IDEA requires schools to provide a FAPE to each
student with a disability. A FAPE has two components: (1) a
“special education” program and (2) “related services.”46
“Special education” is defined in the regulations as “specially
designed instruction . . . conducted in the classroom, in the
home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings” and
also includes physical education.47 “Related services” include
“supportive services” such as counseling and speech therapy.48
School districts must provide these two components of a FAPE
at public expense, without any charge to the parents, from
preschool through secondary school.49
School districts must follow specific regulations under
the IDEA that require school districts to (1) evaluate students
with disabilities before providing special education services,50
(2) tailor each special education student’s program according to
his or her “Individualized Education Program,”51 (IEP) and (3)
44

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(5).
See YELL, supra note 7, at 72. New Mexico was the last state to accept
IDEA funding, upon realizing that in order to meet the mandates of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act it essentially had to comply with much of the IDEA. Id.
46
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
47
34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(1) (2010).
48
Id. § 300.34(a). The regulation reads in part:
45

Related services means transportation and such developmental, corrective,
and other supportive services as are required to assist a child with a
disability to benefit from special education, and includes speech-language
pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic
recreation, early identification and assessment of disabilities in children,
counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and
mobility services, and medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes.
Related services also include school health services and school nurse services,
social work services in schools, and parent counseling and training.
Id.
49

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Generally, states must provide students between ages
three and twenty-one with a FAPE, see id. § 1412(a)(1)(A), but in all cases for students
between the ages of five and seventeen. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(B); see also TURNBULL III,
supra note 32, at 37 (discussing age requirements).
50
34 C.F.R. § 300.301.
51
Id. § 300.323.
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provide procedural safeguards to protect the rights of parents
and students.52
1. Evaluations
A student cannot receive special education services until
she has been properly evaluated to determine whether she has
a disability and, if so, whether she requires special education
services.53 The IDEA and U.S. Department of Education
regulations specify the procedures school districts must follow
in identifying and evaluating students who might have a
disability.54 Either a parent or the school may request an initial
evaluation to determine if a child has a disability.55 Once a
request has been made, a public agency56 must conduct an
evaluation, which must consist of a variety of assessment tools
and methods to compile relevant data on the student, including
his or her academic, functional, and developmental levels.57
This information must then be used to determine whether the
student has a disability and to identify the child’s educational
needs.58 Schools are then required to reevaluate identified
students at least every three years unless the school and
parents agree otherwise.59
2. The Individualized Education Program (IEP)
Schools are required to provide each identified special
education student with an IEP, which is a written document
that is developed and reviewed according to specified

52

Id. § 300.500.
See YELL, supra note 7, at 223.
54
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.301.
55
34 C.F.R. § 300.301. The school district must obtain parental consent
before commencing the initial evaluation of a child. Id. § 300.300(a)(1). If the parent
fails to consent to the initial evaluation, school districts may, but are not required, to
utilize the procedural safeguards outlined in 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 to seek an initial
evaluation of a student with a suspected disability. Id. § 300.300(a)(3)(i).
56
“Public agency” includes the state educational agency, local educational
agency, educational service agency, nonprofit public charter schools, or “any other
political subdivisions of the State that are responsible for providing education to
children with disabilities.” Id. § 300.33.
57
See id. § 300.304(b); see also GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 57-74
(summarizing the identification and evaluation requirements of the IDEA).
58
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a).
59
34 C.F.R. § 300.303(b). While the reevaluation process is only required
every three years, the IEP Team is required to meet at least annually to review each
special education student’s IEP. See id. § 300.324(b).
53
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procedures.60 The Supreme Court has described the IEP as the
“centerpiece” of the Act—the “primary vehicle” for carrying out
Congress’s goals.61 Each IEP must include (1) a statement of the
student’s current level of functioning;62 (2) a statement of
“measurable annual goals” designed to meet the student’s
individual needs;63 (3) a description of how and when progress
towards these goals will be measured;64 (4) a statement of the
related services to be provided to the student;65 (5) a statement
explaining to what extent, if any, a child will be excluded from
the regular classroom;66 and (6) a statement outlining any
testing accommodations to be provided to the student.67 The
IDEA regulations also require the IEP to be developed and
reviewed annually by an “IEP Team,” which must include the
parents and specified teaching professionals.68
3. Procedural Safeguards
In addition to the evaluation and IEP requirements,
school districts must also provide procedural safeguards to
protect the due process rights of parents and students.69 One of
the primary protections provided by the IDEA is the parental
right to notice.70 School districts are required to provide parents
with notice, written in plain English, explaining all of the
procedural safeguards under the IDEA.71 Each school district is
60

Id. § 300.320(a).
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
62
34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1). The statement of a student’s present level of
functioning must also state how the child’s disability affects his or her participation in
the general education curriculum. Id.
63
Id. § 300.320(a)(2). The annual goals are required to be designed to meet a
student’s individual needs and to allow the student to make progress in the general
education curriculum. Id.
64
Id. § 300.320(a)(3). Schools are required to periodically issue reports on
whether the student is meeting his or her IEP goals. Id. These reports should be issued
when report cards are provided. Id.
65
Id. § 300.320(a)(4). The IEP must also include a statement of what
“program modifications or supports” will be provided to allow the student to reach his
or her annual goals. Id.
66
Id. § 300.320(a)(5).
67
Id. § 300.320(a).
68
Id. §§ 300.321, 300.324(b). The “IEP Team” must include the parents of the
child, at least one regular education teacher, at least one special education teacher, a
representative of the school district, and, whenever appropriate, the child. Id. § 300.321.
69
Id. § 300.500.
70
See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 147 (“The significance of notice as
a procedural right cannot be underestimated.”).
71
34 C.F.R. § 300.504.
61

2011]

MAKING UP FOR LOST EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

1727

also required to have procedures in place that allow parents to
challenge school district action (or inaction) under the IDEA and
to resolve disputes.72 The IDEA requires school districts to
develop a voluntary mediation process where the parents and
school districts can attempt to reach a legally binding
resolution.73 If the mediation process is unsuccessful, parents can
proceed with a due process complaint through the school
district’s impartial hearing process.74 Once a parent or school
district has exhausted this administrative process, the aggrieved
party may bring a civil action in either state or federal court.75
The evaluations, IEP processes, and procedural
safeguards required by the IDEA were designed by Congress to
achieve the dual goals of guaranteeing special education students
access to a FAPE and ensuring parental participation in the
process.76 Given the IDEA’s procedurally centered framework,
perhaps it is no surprise that courts developed a FAPE standard
that scrutinizes a school’s compliance with the Act’s procedural
mandates as well as a school’s fulfillment of the IDEA’s
substantive requirements.77 Despite Congress’s continued
emphasis on the IDEA’s procedural requirements, courts have
failed to recalibrate the standards for awarding compensatory
educational services to account for the increasingly complex
requirements enumerated in recent IDEA amendments,
especially for the IEP creation and implementation process.78

72

Id. § 300.506(a).
Id. § 300.506.
74
See id. § 300.511; see generally Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of
Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 401 (2006) (examining the remedial authority of impartial hearing and
review officers under the IDEA). The IDEA allows states to have either a one- or twotiered administrative review process. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006). If the initial
impartial hearing is conducted by any agency besides the state’s educational agency,
then the party must be allowed to appeal to the state’s educational agency. See 34
C.F.R. § 300.514 (setting forth the requirements of an administrative appeal at the
state administrative level).
75
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).
76
See Thomas F. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can’t Agree, Who
Really Decides? Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review Under the Education for all
Handicapped Children Act, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 70 (1988).
77
See infra Part II.
78
See Dixie Snow Huefner, The Risks and Opportunities of the IEP
Requirements Under IDEA ‘97, 33 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 195, 196-97 (2000) (comparing the
1990 and 1997 versions of the IDEA and finding the latter to have expanded the IEP
requirements).
73
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DEFINING “FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION”

The IDEA requires school districts to provide students
with disabilities a “free appropriate public education,” but the
Act does not define the word appropriate.79 Without a statutory
definition, most courts still rely on slightly expanded versions
of the Supreme Court’s early definition of FAPE when deciding
whether to award a remedy.80 In 1982, the Supreme Court, in
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v. Rowley, interpreted the meaning of free appropriate
public education.81 After reviewing the legislative history of the
Act, Justice Rehnquist concluded that, while the Act requires
school districts to provide special education and related
services to students with disabilities, the Act does not require
school districts to “maximize” each student’s potential.82 The
Rowley Court held that a state satisfies the FAPE requirement
by “providing personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction.”83 The minimalist FAPE standard required by
Rowley treats the IDEA as setting a “basic floor of opportunity”
for students with disabilities.84
In reaching its decision, the Rowley court set forth a
two-step test to analyze denial of FAPE claims:
First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the
Act? And second, is the individualized educational program
developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these

79

See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (setting forth definitions under the IDEA).
See Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts
Defined a Free Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1,
6-7 (2005) (examining how the circuit courts are divided in interpreting the Rowley
FAPE standard).
81
458 U.S. 176, 186, 203 (1982).
82
Id. at 198-99.
83
Id. at 203.
84
Id. at 201 (internal quotations omitted); see also Eyer, supra note 3, at 622
(arguing the Rowley FAPE standard “set the tone for low expectations and minimal
compliance by educational agencies”). In describing the Rowley FAPE standard, the
Sixth Circuit used an automobile analogy, stating that the Act requires the provision of
a “serviceable Chevrolet,” but not a “Cadillac.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d
455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to
Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 217, 228-29 & n.47 (2005) (collecting cases using and expanding on the
automobile analogy).
80
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requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations
imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.85

The two-step test developed in Rowley thus bifurcated the
FAPE requirement into a procedural requirement and a
substantive requirement.86
A.

The Procedural Requirement of a FAPE

The procedural protections of the IDEA are intended to
ensure that parents have a voice in their child’s educational
87
placement. The procedural safeguards conferred on parents of
students with disabilities were explicitly outlined by Congress
88
in the IDEA. In Rowley, the Supreme Court recognized that
Congress “placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance
with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure
of participation at every stage of the administrative
process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the resulting
89
IEP against a substantive standard.”
A school can be found to have denied a student a FAPE
on procedural grounds if it failed to adhere to the IDEA’s
90
procedural requirements, resulting in harm to the student. A
number of courts have found that procedural violations alone
91
are sufficient to establish a denial of a FAPE. For example,
the Fourth Circuit held that a school district denied a student a
FAPE when it decided to move a student from a residential
facility to a public school and then developed a post-hoc IEP to
92
reflect this decision. Similarly, in W.G. v. Board of Trustees of
Target Range School District No. 23, the school district proposed
a “preexisting, predetermined program” without any input from
the student’s general education teacher, and the school refused
to consider any alternatives despite the parents’ objection to the
85

458 U.S. at 206-07.
See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 33-34.
87
See YELL, supra note 7, at 146.
88
See supra Part I.B.3.
89
458 U.S. at 205-06.
90
See YELL, supra note 7, at 153.
91
See, e.g., Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir.
1985) (finding that procedural violations are sufficient by themselves to establish a
denial of a FAPE); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that
a student was entitled to compensatory education where a school district failed to
provide parental notice before terminating the student’s educational placement).
92
Spielberg v. Henrico Cnty. Pub. Schs., 853 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (4th Cir.
1988) (finding that the school’s “failure to follow [IDEA] procedures is sufficient to hold
that the defendants failed to provide [the student] with a FAPE”).
86
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93

IEP. The Ninth Circuit found that the school district “failed to
provide [the student] with a FAPE by failing to comply with the
94
specified procedures for preparing the IEP.”
Although procedural violations alone may be enough to
establish a denial of a FAPE, a number of courts have found
that mere “technical violations” that do not harm the student
95
are not sufficient to establish a denial of a FAPE. The First
Circuit, in Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, summarized
the general rule: “Before an IEP is set aside, there must be some
rational basis to believe that procedural inadequacies
compromised the pupil’s right to an appropriate education,
seriously hampered the parents’ opportunity to participate in
the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational
96
Therefore, a procedural violation does not
benefits.”
automatically result in a denial of a FAPE, but courts are likely
to find a denial of a FAPE if the procedural violations have
adversely affected the student’s education or impeded the
97
parent from participating in the IEP process.
In the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, Congress
clarified what types of procedural violations can amount to a
denial of a FAPE, essentially adopting a rule that reflects the
98
test used in Roland M. However, even if a court finds that a
school district has complied with the IDEA’s procedural
mandates, the court may still find a denial of a FAPE if the
school has not met the IDEA’s substantive requirement—
99
supplying the student with some educational benefit.

93

W.G. v. Bd. of Trs., 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1487. In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit also found a procedural
violation meriting the vacation of the district court’s summary judgment order in favor
of the school district where a school district failed to ensure that a student’s general
education teacher attended the IEP meeting. See M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d
634, 651 (9th Cir. 2005).
95
See YELL, supra note 7, at 153.
96
Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d. 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
97
See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484 (internal citations omitted).
98
See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-446, § 615(f)(3)(E)(ii), 118 Stat. 2647, 2722 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2006)) (“In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing
officer may find that a child did not receive a free appropriate public education only if
the procedural inadequacies (I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public
education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the
decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education
to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”).
99
See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982); see also infra Part II.B.
94
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The Substantive Requirement of a FAPE

While the Rowley court only required school districts to
supply some educational benefit to students with disabilities,
later decisions have required more of school districts.100 Cases
decided shortly after the Rowley decision tended to give a strict
interpretation to the Rowley requirement, finding that an IEP
was appropriate as long as it conferred some benefit.101 In later
cases, however, courts began to apply various standards that
required more than a superficial benefit.102
For example, in Polk v. Central Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16, the Third Circuit held that the IDEA
requires “more than a trivial educational benefit.”103 The
student in Polk had severe mental and physical disabilities, but
the school district refused to provide any students with
physical therapy.104 The district court granted summary
judgment for the school district, finding that the student’s
educational plan, under the Rowley standard, resulted in “some
educational benefit,” even if he was not receiving certain
related services.105 The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the
district court had applied the Rowley standard out of context.106
The Third Circuit relied on both the Rowley decision
and the legislative history of the IDEA to reach its conclusion
that a student’s IEP must be formulated to provide the student
with a “meaningful benefit.”107 After carefully reviewing the
history of the IDEA, the court determined that “[j]ust as
Congress did not write a blank check, neither did it anticipate
that states would engage in the idle gesture of providing
special education designed to confer only trivial benefit.”108 The
Third Circuit explained that because the student in Rowley had
100

See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d
Cir. 1999) (“When students display considerable intellectual potential, IDEA requires
‘a great deal more than a negligible [benefit].’” (quoting Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988))).
101
See, e.g., Doe v. Lawson, 579 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (D. Mass. 1984) (stating
that the question is whether the “program will provide some educational benefit”).
102
Huefner, supra note 13, at 368 (“Lower court standards varied, but over time,
most courts looked at the student’s IEP and decided that trivial progress toward IEP goals
was insufficient and that progress should be ‘meaningful,’ ‘satisfactory,’ or ‘adequate.’”).
103
853 F.2d at 180.
104
Id. at 172.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 184.
108
Id.
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received a substantial benefit from her education, the Rowley
court did not have the opportunity to fully examine what level
of benefit was required by the IDEA.109 The Polk court rejected
the view that the “some benefit” standard in Rowley was
equivalent to “any benefit at all.”110 According to Polk, the IDEA
requires school districts to do more than merely provide
students with a “de minimis benefit.”111
Courts have struggled with the application of the
“meaningful benefit” standard, relying on various factors to
measure the level of benefit provided by an IEP.112 Because the
courts are wary of “‘meddling in state educational
methodology,’” they will look for “‘objective evidence’ indicating
whether the child is likely to make progress or regress under
the proposed plan.”113 In order to measure progression or
regression, courts will consider whether the student is
attaining passing marks and advancing from grade to grade.114
This standard is not always an honest measurement of
educational benefit, however, because many students with
disabilities, especially those in an inclusion setting, will
advance from grade to grade despite the lack of any meaningful
progress.115 In addition to looking at a student’s grades and
regular advancement, some courts have turned to standardized

109

Id. at 180.
Id. at 183.
111
Id. at 182.
112
See YELL, supra note 7, at 155 (explaining that courts do not have a
“precise definition to follow when determining whether the education offered is
meaningful or trivial,” but that “[t]his lack of precision appears appropriate because
what constitutes a meaningful education to particular students can only be ascertained
on a case-by-case basis”).
113
Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997)).
114
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 n.28 (1982) (“When the
handicapped child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school
system, the achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will
be one important factor in determining educational benefit.”).
115
See Huefner, supra note 13, at 370 (arguing that the Supreme Court in
Rowley did not anticipate the inclusion movement and the fact that many students
with disabilities in the inclusion setting are “often advanced with their chronological
peers while not performing academically at grade level”); see also Straube v. Fla. Union
Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The record suggests that we
cannot totally rely on the Rowley standard to assess the educational benefit derived by
[the student] because the continual decrease in his grades and the failure of his
reading level to move up in six years suggests that perhaps [the student] was being
moved from grade to grade in order to get him through the system.”).
110
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test scores as a metric of progress.116 Regardless of the standard
employed by the court, a student’s “progress must be viewed in
light of the limitations imposed by the child’s disability.”117
While it is clear that some courts will require a school to
provide a student with disabilities a program that confers some
“meaningful benefit,” it is less clear what measurement
standard courts will use to determine the level of benefit.118
Given the confusion over what constitutes satisfactory
progress under the IDEA, commentators have urged courts to
adopt various standards for determining whether a student has
been denied a FAPE.119 Some commentators have argued that
courts should adopt a per se approach for determining denials
of FAPE.120 Under a per se approach, a failure to implement any
part of an IEP would constitute a denial of a FAPE.121 The
argument is that when the parties have agreed to an IEP, the
courts are not in the position to determine what portions of
that IEP are material.122 While the per se approach comports
with the IDEA’s extensive procedural protections that go
toward developing a student’s IEP,123 many courts have rejected
it, electing instead to apply a material failure standard.124
Others have argued that courts should adopt a FAPE
standard that better reflects Congress’s emphasis on the IEP,125
116

See, e.g., K.C. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:03-CV-3501-TWT, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47652, at *48-49 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (finding that a student’s IEP
reports, grades, and standardized test scores all indicated “adequate academic progress”).
117
Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1121 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
118
See Aron, supra note 80, at 7 (“[S]ix Circuit Courts of Appeals apply the
‘meaningful benefit’ standard, five apply a lesser standard in the nature of ‘adequate
benefit’ or ‘some benefit,’ and one appears to apply a mixture of both.”).
119
See, e.g., Ferster, supra note 13, at 103 (advocating for a per se approach);
Huefner, supra note 13, at 379 (advocating for a standard requiring “substantial
progress” towards IEP goals).
120
Ferster, supra note 13, at 103.
121
Id. at 92.
122
See Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 827 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting).
123
See Ferster, supra note 13, at 103; see also supra Part I.B.2.
124
See, e.g., Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822 (“[W]e hold that a material failure to
implement an IEP violates the IDEA.”); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200
F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e conclude that to prevail on a claim under the
IDEA, a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de
minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP, and, instead, must demonstrate
that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or significant
provisions of the IEP.”).
125
See Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Educational Program
Requirements Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been
and Where Should We Be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 502 (1991) (“A process
anchored more tightly to the IEP might have produced the same result in Rowley while

1734

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

as well as the various amendments to the IDEA that stress the
importance of measuring a student’s progress towards her
individual IEP goals.126 This IEP-focused FAPE standard would
require courts to consider whether a student has made
“substantial progress toward at least a significant [number] of
the [IEP] goals.”127 Tying the FAPE determination to the
demonstrated level of progress towards IEP goals would result
in more judicial attention to the carefully crafted IEP
requirements detailed in the IDEA.128
Adopting an IEP-centric FAPE standard could greatly
reduce some of the confusion surrounding compensatory
educational services awards. As a first step, courts should
begin to clearly enunciate when they are awarding
“compensatory education” versus “additional services” instead
of grouping the two remedies together under one vague title.
Removing this simple source of ambiguity would aid courts in
readily identifying which of these two common scenarios is
being presented to them—namely, whether they are addressing
the needs of a student who is protected by the IDEA or one who
is no longer eligible.
A version of the IEP-centered FAPE standard would be
particularly helpful when applied to “additional services” cases,
though perhaps less functional in “compensatory education”
cases. In the context of “additional services” cases, where the
student is still protected by the IDEA, courts should look to the
student’s IEP goals, objectives, and assessment data to
offering guidance as to how benefit is to be measured for other students.”); see also supra
notes 60-68 and accompanying text (outlining IEP requirements).
126
See Huefner, supra note 13, at 373 (arguing that many courts have failed
to reconsider the substantive Rowley standard “despite the clear emphasis on
measurable progress since the 1997 amendments”); see also Huefner, supra note 78, at
196-98 (comparing the 1990 and 1997 versions of the IDEA IEP requirements). The
1997 amendments to the IDEA require IEPs to contain goals that are “measurable,” as
well as “[a] statement of . . . how . . . progress toward the . . . goals . . . will be
measured.” Id. at 127 (final alteration in original); see also Scott F. Johnson,
Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
561, 580 (2003) (arguing that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA “incorporate the high
expectations of state educational standards into the programming for disabled
students” and that these amendments “show that FAPE is now more than access to a
basic floor of opportunity”).
127
Huefner, supra note 13, at 379.
128
See supra Part I.B.2. Additionally, changing to an IEP-centered FAPE
standard that focuses on measurable progress is in accord with the prevailing view
that Congress, through the 1997 and 2004 amendments to the IDEA, “has raised the
‘floor of opportunity’ to ensure high expectations for educational achievement,
participation in the general curriculum and preparation for independent living in
adulthood.” Ferster, supra note 13, at 83-84.
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determine (1) whether the student is making sufficient
progress towards her IEP goals and, if not, (2) whether the
school has taken steps to appropriately revise the IEP goals,
extend special education services, or improve instructional
methods to address the lack of progress.129 Using this standard,
courts could better isolate the problem by identifying the lack
of progress towards specific IEP goals, which they can remedy
by crafting individually tailored “additional services” awards.
For example, if a court finds that a student is not making
adequate progress towards IEP goals and objectives related to
reading, it can award the student “additional services” in the
form of literacy tutoring.130 This approach would reduce
confusion (and thereby the need for expensive litigation), while
also guiding the courts and administrative hearing officers in
crafting appropriate, narrowly tailored remedies that address
the individual student’s unique needs.
The IEP-centered approach, however, may be less
appropriate in the “compensatory education” context where the
student is no longer protected by the IDEA because of age or
graduation status. In these cases, a more general but stricter
FAPE standard should be applied because of the exceptional
nature of the “compensatory education” remedy, which forces a
school district to fund a student’s education past her twentyfirst birthday.131
129

See Huefner, supra note 125, at 508 (advocating for the use of IEP goals and
objectives as “reference points” in evaluating whether the student is receiving a FAPE).
Under Huefner’s IEP-centered approach, evidence of trivial progress or regression toward
IEP objectives “would be indications either that the goals and objectives, the special
education services, or the methods and materials were inappropriate.” Id.
130
This approach requires that the school district has complied with the IDEA’s
IEP requirements—specifically, that the school district has provided the student with an
IEP that contains measurable and appropriate annual goals given the student’s present
level of functioning. See supra Part I.B.2. For example, a measurable annual goal might
read: “Given a text passage of between 250 and 400 words at a sixth grade reading level,
Curtis will read the passage aloud with 95-100% accuracy in three consecutive weekly
trials.” Curtis’ Sample IEP, IEP QUALITY PROJECT, https://iepq.education.illinois.edu/
documents/studentscenarios/curtis/Curtis_IEP.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). If the IEP
goals are not measurable or not appropriate given the student’s present level of
functioning, the court should require the creation of a new IEP that contains appropriate
and measurable goals. See Huefner, supra note 125, at 512 (arguing that school
districts should have the burden of demonstrating that the IEP contains measurable
goals designed to address the student’s needs). Arguably, courts should adopt a rule
that an IEP that lacks measurable goals is per se inappropriate. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2006) (requiring IEPs to contain “measurable annual goals” that
meet the student’s needs and “enable[s] the child to be involved in and make progress
in the general . . . curriculum”); see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text
(discussing per se FAPE standard).
131
See infra Part III.B.
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REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE IDEA

Once a student has been found to have been denied a
FAPE—for procedural reasons, substantive reasons, or both—
the hearing officer or court must devise an appropriate remedy.
The IDEA does not expressly enumerate the forms of relief
available to remedy a denial of a FAPE, but instead simply
provides that courts can grant “such relief as the court determines
is appropriate.”132 Resolving which remedies are “appropriate” is a
job that has largely been left to the courts,133 and the Supreme
Court has made it clear that courts have “broad discretion” in
fashioning relief.134 Courts and administrative hearing officers
have granted injunctive relief,135 monetary damages,136 tuition
reimbursement,137 compensatory education,138 additional services,139
and attorneys’ fees140 to remedy denials of FAPE.
A.

Tuition Reimbursement

Much of the confusion surrounding compensatory
educational services is due to the irregular evolution of the two
remedies, which both have their roots in the tuition
reimbursement remedy approved by the Supreme Court in
132

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
See YELL, supra note 7, at 294.
134
Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
135
See, e.g., Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming injunction).
136
Compare Cappillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d. 513,
515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
violation of the IDEA), and Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. Supp. 940, 945 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(same), and Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2001)
(allowing compensatory damages for violations of the IDEA, but only in extraordinary
circumstances), with Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587
F.3d 176, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2009) (compensatory and punitive damages not available under
the IDEA), and Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). For a
discussion of monetary damages under the IDEA, see Seligmann, supra note 35.
137
See, e.g., Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369 (allowing for tuition reimbursement);
see also infra Part III.A.
138
See, e.g., Miener ex rel. Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir.
1986) (allowing for compensatory education awards); see also infra Part III.B.
139
See, e.g., Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 06-040 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t June 19, 2006), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2006/06-040.htm
(awarding additional services); see also infra Part III.C.
140
See, e.g., A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2005) (upholding an award of attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party in an IDEA
administrative hearing). The IDEA expressly provides for awards of attorneys’ fees. See
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). While the IDEA permits attorneys’ fees awards, the
Supreme Court has held that the IDEA does not allow prevailing parents to recover the
costs of experts or consultants. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006).
133
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Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education.141 Prior
to Burlington, a commonly litigated issue was whether parents
who unilaterally placed their child in a private school could seek
reimbursement under the IDEA if they established that the
public school placement was inappropriate.142 Pre-Burlington
courts and hearing officers often refused to award tuition
reimbursement if the parents acted unilaterally, unless the
parent could prove bad faith on the part of the school district.143
In Burlington, the parents sought tuition reimbursement
after unilaterally placing their child in a private school because
they believed that the proposed public school setting was
inappropriate.144 The Supreme Court unanimously held that
parents could seek private school tuition reimbursement under
the IDEA from the school district if the school failed to provide
the child with an appropriate IEP.145 Distinguishing tuition
reimbursement from a damages award, Justice Rehnquist
clarified that “[r]eimbursement merely requires the Town to
belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and
would have borne in the first instance had it developed a
proper IEP.”146
After Burlington, the question remained as to whether
parents could be reimbursed for private schools that did not
meet the state’s educational standards.147 The Supreme Court
answered that question affirmatively in Florence County School
District Four v. Carter, finding that a parent’s “failure to select
a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an
unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement.”148 The
Carter court clarified that parents are not held to the same

141

471 U.S. 359 (1985).
GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 231-32.
143
See Eugene B. Jr. v. Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 635 F. Supp. 753,
756 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“In the view of both the Commissioner and the hearing officer,
plaintiffs were not entitled to tuition reimbursement because they acted unilaterally in
enrolling [the student] in the Lowell School and there were no ‘exceptional
circumstances’ or ‘unique factual situations’ warranting an award of tuition in the face
of such unilateral placement.”).
144
471 U.S. at 362.
145
Id. at 369.
146
Id. at 370-71.
147
ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 334. Some courts had refused to
award relief if the private school was not approved by the state education agency. See,
e.g., Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that the court
could not award a placement at an unapproved private school).
148
510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993).
142
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FAPE standard in selecting a private school.149 Therefore,
parents seeking tuition reimbursement are only required to
establish that the public school system did not offer a FAPE
and that the private school is appropriate.150
In later amendments to the IDEA, Congress clarified a
number of issues that had arisen before and after the Burlington
and Carter decisions.151 The right to tuition reimbursement,
along with specified limitations on the remedy, is now expressly
provided for in the IDEA and the federal regulations.152 Tuition
reimbursement may be reduced or denied if the parents did not
provide adequate notice to the school district, or if a court finds
that the parents acted unreasonably.153
Despite the clarification provided by the new federal
regulations, courts still struggled with the issue of whether
students who were not previously enrolled in special education
services in a public school could receive tuition reimbursement.154
Initially, the circuit courts were split on the issue.155 In Greenland
School District v. Amy N., the First Circuit found that “tuition
reimbursement is only available for children who have previously
received ‘special education and related services.’”156 The Second
Circuit, in contrast, concluded that students who had not
previously received special education services from the public
school system were not precluded from seeking tuition
reimbursement.157 The Supreme Court, in Forest Grove School
District v. T.A., resolved the circuit split, holding that tuition

149

Id. at 13 (finding that the requirements in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(A) (now
§ 1401(9)) “do not make sense in the context of a parental placement”).
150
See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2010).
151
ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 334-35.
152
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d) (outlining the
limitations on reimbursement); see also Lewis M. Wasserman, Reimbursement to
Parents of Tuition and Other Costs Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 171, 201-06 (2006).
153
34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d). Reimbursement may be reduced or denied if the
parents do not notify the school district at the most recent IEP meeting that they are
rejecting the public placement and enrolling their child in a private school at public
expense, or if the parents fail to provide written notice to the school district at least ten
days before removing their child. Id.
154
ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 335.
155
GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 233-34.
156
358 F.3d 150, 159 (1st Cir. 2004).
157
Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 368 (2d Cir. 2006). The Eleventh
Circuit also gave a broad interpretation to the availability of tuition reimbursement.
See M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e conclude
that parents are not required in all cases to first enroll their child in public school
pursuant to an inadequate IEP in order to preserve their right to reimbursement.”).
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reimbursement was an available remedy even for students who
had not previously received special education services.158
While the decision in Forest Grove was considered a
victory for parents of special education students,159 the remedy
of tuition reimbursement is generally not a viable option for
low-income families that cannot afford the up-front financial
burden of enrolling their children in costly private programs.160
Parents who unilaterally place their children in private school
run the risk that reimbursement will be limited or denied
altogether.161 Because of these risks, many parents will forgo
the option of tuition reimbursement and rely on compensatory
remedies instead.162
B.

Compensatory Education

Compensatory education has been a particularly
important remedy for families unable to afford the “up front”
risks of unilaterally enrolling their child in a private school.163
As it evolved into a more developed and accepted remedy, it
became the “coin of the realm” in cases arising under the
IDEA.164 In general, compensatory education is designed to
remedy past denials of FAPE by making up for lost educational
progress.165 Compensatory education can be comprised of
extended-day programming, summer school, tutoring, or other
158

129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009) (“The IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the
cost of private special-education services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE
and the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child
previously received special education or related services through the public school.”).
Prior to Forest Grove, an equally divided Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed a Second Circuit decision authorizing tuition reimbursement for students who
had not previously received special education services. See Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 552
U.S. 1 (2007) (per curiam), aff’g 193 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2006); see also GUERNSEY &
KLARE, supra note 1, at 234.
159
Natalie Pyong Kocher, Note, Lost in Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA’s
Inherent Paradox, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 333, 348 (2010) (“Forest Grove is viewed
as a victory for parents of children with disabilities who may now seek reimbursement
for private school tuition, even if their child never attended a public school.”).
160
Emily Blumberg, Comment, Recent Development: Forest Grove School
District v. T.A., 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 163, 176 (2010). In Burlington, the Court
noted that “parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency
of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their
own financial risk.” Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985).
161
GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 234.
162
Blumberg, supra note 160, at 165.
163
Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedy of Compensatory Education Under the IDEA,
95 ED. L. REP. 483, 483 (1995).
164
Id.
165
See YELL, supra note 7, at 300.
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related services.166 The evolution of the remedy has created
uncertainty over the availability of the remedy and the proper
standard for calculating awards.
1. The Evolution of the Compensatory Education
Remedy
The remedy of compensatory education grew out of the
tuition reimbursement remedy authorized by the Supreme
Court in Burlington.167 Prior to Burlington, some courts had
expressed concerns about granting awards of compensatory
education, viewing the remedy as dangerously similar to a
damages award.168 Perceiving compensatory education as
indistinguishable from damages, some courts adopted the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning as laid out in Anderson v.
Thompson, which held that damages are generally not
available under the Act.169 In Anderson, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed the legislative history of the Act and concluded that it
was “intended in most cases to provide only injunctive relief as
a final procedural safeguard that would ensure an appropriate
educational program for a handicapped child.”170 The court
concluded that Congress had decided to ensure that students
with disabilities would receive appropriate educations through
an “elaborate system of procedural safeguards,” rather than
through compensatory relief.171
166

See id.
Antonis Katsiyannis & John W. Maag, Ensuring Appropriate Education:
Emerging Remedies, Litigation, Compensation, and Other Legal Considerations, 63
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 451, 458 (1997); see also supra Part III.A. Some commentators
have described the compensatory education remedy as a “poor man’s Burlington.”
Deborah A. Mattison & Stewart R. Hakola, Availability of Damages and Equitable
Remedies Under the IDEA, Section 504, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 7 INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (Special Report No. 7, 1992).
168
See, e.g., Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Any
relief sought in the nature of compensatory education is the same as a claim for
damages.”); Miener v. Missouri., 498 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d in part, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir.
1986); Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
compensatory education is not a form of equitable relief, but more like a damages
award); but see Campbell v. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 56 (N.D.
Ala. 1981) (awarding two years of education past the student’s twenty-first birthday to
remedy a previous denial of a FAPE).
169
Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1981); Miener v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982) (partially adopting reasoning of Anderson);
but see Cappillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d. 513, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (allowing a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the IDEA).
170
Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1210.
171
Id. at 1212.
167
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Despite finding that the statute did not generally allow
for damages, the court, in dicta, outlined two “exceptional
circumstances in which a limited damages award might be
appropriate.”172 According to Anderson, a limited damages
award173 might be appropriate if (1) the child’s physical health
would otherwise be endangered,174 or (2) if the school district
acted in bad faith.175 While some courts adopted Anderson’s
exceptional circumstances exceptions,176 other courts criticized
the Anderson court for failing to distinguish general damages
from tuition reimbursement.177 Courts deciding the issue after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington determined that

172

Id. at 1213.
In a footnote, the Anderson court clarified that tort liability damages would
never be appropriate, only damages to compensate parents for the “costs of obtaining
services that the school district was required to provide.” Id. at 1213 n.12.
174
Id. at 1213-14 (“Congress, which so explicitly expressed its concern for the
needs and rights of handicapped children, could not have intended a child to remain in
a placement in which there was a serious risk of injury to that child’s physical
health.”). The court carved out this exception by relying on Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp.
968 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In Tatro, the school district refused to provide catheterization for
a student with spinal bifida and so the parents placed the student in a private center.
Id. at 970-71, 978. The court did not decide whether damages were generally available,
but simply concluded that when “parents cannot enroll the child without a risk of
injury to the child because a school will not provide a required related service,
appropriate relief ought to include the cost of alternative sources of education and
therapy.” Id. at 978.
175
Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1214 (“A second exceptional circumstance would
exist when the defendant has acted in bad faith by failing to comply with the
procedural provisions . . . in an egregious fashion.”). The Anderson court further
explained the second exception to the general rule that damages are unavailable under
the Act:
173

Congress could not have intended, however, that parents would keep their
child in an inappropriate situation in a case in which the school district was
acting in bad faith. In those circumstances, most parents could and likely
would arrange unilaterally for the appropriate services. Should the parents
finally prevail in their judicial action, in those circumstances money damages
for the cost of these services should be awarded.
Id.
176

See, e.g., Gregg B. v. Bd. of Educ., 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(“Such reasoning appears sound to this court.”); Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081
(11th Cir. 1983) (implying it would adopt the Anderson exceptional circumstances test);
Dep’t of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying and expanding
the Anderson exceptional circumstances test); see also Mark H. Van Pelt, Comment,
Compensatory Educational Services and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1469, 1471 n.8 (1984) (collecting cases adopting the Anderson test).
177
Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121, 127 (D. Mass. 1983) (“In this court’s opinion,
with respect, the Anderson court failed adequately to note the difference between general
damages, which could be a very serious matter, and reimbursement for tuition payments
that would have been the town’s responsibility under the appropriate IEP.”).
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the Anderson test was too restrictive for determining when
reimbursement was appropriate.178
Although the Burlington decision was decided in the
context of tuition reimbursement,179 the decision had a direct
impact on the future of compensatory education.180 Before
Burlington, the Eighth Circuit, in Miener v. Missouri, adopted
the Anderson view that “‘appropriate’ relief was generally
intended to be restricted to injunctive relief, within which the
district judge would have wide latitude to fashion an
individualized educational program for the child.”181 In Miener,
the school district evaluated the student and found that she had
severe learning disabilities and behavioral disorders stemming
from a reoccurring brain tumor, but did not provide her with
special education services.182 Unable to afford any private
options, the student’s father enrolled her in a state hospital and
sought compensatory educational services to remedy the denial
of a FAPE spanning her three-year hospitalization.183
The district court dismissed the claims for compensatory
education, holding that a private right for damages could not be
implied from the Act.184 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the compensatory education claim on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, but reversed and remanded the case back to the district
court to decide other issues.185 By the time the case reached the
Court of Appeals for a second time, the Burlington decision had
come down and the father reasserted the compensatory education
claim in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.186 The defendants
argued that compensatory education did not fall within the new
Burlington framework because compensatory education, unlike
tuition reimbursement, did not seek to recompense the parents
178

See, e.g., Jenkins v. Florida, 815 F.2d 629, 631 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Anderson
presents too restrictive a test to determine the appropriateness of reimbursement as a
remedy.”).
179
See 471 U.S. 359, 363 (1985); see also supra Part III.A.
180
See Katsiyannis & Maag, supra note 167, at 458 (explaining that several of
the Courts of Appeals have “extended the Supreme Court’s rationale in Burlington to
support the award of compensatory education”).
181
Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982). Although the Eighth
Circuit adopted the Anderson view, it declined to adopt the Anderson exceptions. Id. at
980 (“We depart from the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, however, insofar as that court in
dictum recognized two exceptional circumstances in which a limited damage award
might be appropriate.”).
182
Miener ex rel. Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1986).
183
Id. at 751-52.
184
Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
185
Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 983 (8th Cir. 1982).
186
Miener ex rel. Miener, 800 F.2d at 751.
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for previous educational expenses.187 The Eighth Circuit soundly
rejected this argument, stating:
We cannot agree with the defendants that they should escape
liability for these services simply because [the parent] was unable to
provide them in the first instance; we believe that such a result
would be consistent neither with Burlington nor with congressional
intent. Like the retroactive reimbursement in Burlington, imposing
liability for compensatory educational services on the defendants
“merely requires [them] to belatedly pay expenses that [they] should
have paid all along.” Here, as in Burlington, recovery is necessary to
secure the child’s right to a free appropriate public education. We are
confident that Congress did not intend the child’s entitlement to a
free education to turn upon her parent’s ability to “front” its costs.188

Following the Burlington and Miener decisions, courts began to
adopt compensatory education as an “appropriate” remedy
available for students who had been denied a FAPE.189 Courts
reasoned that Congress would not have intended the
availability of a remedy to depend on a parent’s ability to front
the costs of private education.190
Even the U.S. Department of Education has now
recognized the importance of compensatory education as an
available remedy under the IDEA.191 In 1990, in response to an
inquiry, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special
Education Programs (OSEP) stated its position on
compensatory education as an available remedy.192 Citing the
Miener decision, the OSEP stated that it recognized
compensatory education as a remedy for a denial of a FAPE.193
It also stressed that compensatory education is an especially

187
188

Id. at 753.
Id. (quoting Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71

(1985)).
189

See, e.g., Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1993)
(relying on Miener’s extension of Burlington to award compensatory education); Hall v.
Knott Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 406-07 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); Lester H. v.
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071,
1078 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sobol v. Burr,
492 U.S. 902 (1989), reaff’d, 888 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (same).
190
Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872-73 (“[W]e conclude that Congress, by allowing
the courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to cure the deprivation of a child’s right to
a free appropriate public education, did not intend to offer a remedy only to those
parents able to afford an alternative private education.”).
191
See OSEP Policy Letter, 17 E.H.L.R. 522, 522-23 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office
of Special Educ. Programs, Feb. 13, 1990).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 523.
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important remedy for parents who cannot afford appropriate
private placements for their children.194
2. Compensatory Education: Confusion over Age Limits
and Award Calculations
While compensatory education became widely accepted
as an available remedy, courts differed on whether such an
award could exceed the IDEA’s age limit.195 The IDEA provides
that states must generally provide a FAPE to all students with
disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one, with a
few exceptions.196 Some courts read this statutory age limit as a
bar to any compensatory education awards that required a
school district to provide educational services beyond the age
twenty-one.197
In 1988, the Supreme Court, in Honig v. Doe, adopted the
position that the statutory protections of the Act did not extend
past age twenty-one.198 The circuit courts, however, have declined
to read the Honig decision as relevant in the compensatory
education setting.199 The First Circuit, in Pihl v. Massachusetts
Department of Education, explained the inapplicability of Honig
in the context of compensatory education:
The crucial difference between Honig and this case is the nature of
the relief requested. In Honig, Doe was asking the court to make the
school district comply with the Act in the future. But, because Doe
was beyond the age of entitlement for services, he had no right to
194

Id. (“[C]ompensatory education may be the only means through which
children [who] are forced to remain in an inappropriate placement due to their parents’
financial inability to pay for an appropriate private placement would receive FAPE.”).
Additionally, it is the OSEP’s position that compensatory education can be awarded by
impartial hearing officers and that the remedy can take the form of summer school
programs. Id.
195
GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 237.
196
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2006). The IDEA gives states some flexibility in
determining whether or not to provide children between the ages of three to five and
eighteen to twenty-one with public education. Id. It has been argued that the IDEA
probably would not have passed without this limitation, which “recognized that the
states themselves should have some autonomy to continue to educate certain age
groups.” TURNBULL III, supra note 32, at 37.
197
See, e.g., Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (“To grant
appellants’ request for compensatory education would require the District to continue
providing [the student] with educational services beyond the maximum age indicated
in the statute. This result was not intended by Congress.”).
198
484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (“[The student] is now 24 years old and,
accordingly, is no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the EHA, which
limits eligibility to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21.”).
199
Solomon A. Metzger, Compensatory Education Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1839, 1862 (2002).
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demand that the school district comply with the Act either presently
or in the future. By contrast, Karl Pihl is asking only that the court
compensate him for rights that he claims the school district denied
him in the past.200

Thus, courts have been willing to award compensatory
education, even if the student is older than twenty-one, as long
as the denial of a FAPE occurred while the student was
protected by the IDEA.201 If courts strictly applied the statutory
age limit in compensatory education cases, then school districts
could essentially avoid providing a FAPE to students
approaching the age limit.202
Further adding to the confusion surrounding the
compensatory education remedy is the fact that courts are not
in agreement on how to calculate awards.203 Some courts apply
an hour-for-hour formula to determine the appropriate amount
of compensatory education to award a student who has been
denied a FAPE.204 Other courts, however, have rejected this
approach as overly mechanical, and instead apply a more
flexible and individualized approach that better reflects the

200

Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990) (A student
with disabilities who has been denied a FAPE “has the right to ask for compensation
because the School District violated his statutory rights while he was still entitled to
them.”). This view can also draw support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993). In a footnote, the Supreme
Court recognized that a “continuing controversy” exists even when a student has
graduated from high school when the parents are seeking reimbursement for expenses
incurred while the student was protected by the statute. Id. at 4 n.2.
202
Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872. The Third Circuit explained the potentially
dangerous result of strictly applying the statutory age limit examined in Honig to
compensatory education cases:
201

If Honig stands for the proposition defendants assert, school districts would
be immune from suit if they simply stopped educating intended beneficiaries
of the [IDEA] at age 18 or 19. Those beneficiaries’ cases would take at least
two years to be reviewed, and even if the reviewing courts found the school
districts’ behavior egregious, the courts would be powerless to aid the
intended beneficiaries because those beneficiaries would now be over age 21.
We cannot believe that either Congress or the Supreme Court meant to allow
a school district to withhold a disabled minor’s educational rights at age 18 or
19 without remedy.
Id.
203

Compare M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d
Cir. 1996) (“child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period
of deprivation”), with Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (rejecting hour-for-hour “cookie-cutter approach”).
204
M.C., 81 F.3d at 397; Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 35 F. Supp.
2d 1134, 1138 (D. Minn. 1998) (awarding six years of compensatory education to
remedy a six year denial of a FAPE).
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equitable considerations emphasized by the Supreme Court in
Burlington and Carter.205
In Friendship Edison Public Charter School Collegiate
Campus v. Nesbitt, the court took a more flexible approach in
calculating a compensatory education award.206 According to
Nesbitt, a court should fashion an individually tailored
“compensatory education plan” that is designed to compensate
the student for the “grade-level progress not made . . . or
educational benefits that did not accrue due to the loss of
FAPE.”207 Under the grade-level approach a court would
compare the projected grade-level progress a student would
have made if provided with a FAPE with the actual grade-level
progress (or regression) the student made “in spite of the denial
of FAPE.”208 Subtracting the latter from the former yields the
educational benefit that the student did not receive due to the
FAPE denial.209 Finally, the court must estimate how many
instructional hours the student requires to make up for the lost
educational benefit.210 While the grade-level approach requires
more evidence of past and present levels of academic and
functional levels, along with learning rate projections based on
the cognitive abilities of the student, the result is a more
appropriately tailored remedy.211 Given the holistic nature of
this award formulation, however, courts should only apply the
grade-level approach to “compensatory education” cases, while
using the IEP-centered approach to calculate narrower awards
in “additional services” cases.212
C.

Additional Services

While courts have awarded “compensatory education” to
students both over and under the age of twenty-one,213 some
205

Reid, 401 F.3d at 523; see also supra Part III.A.
Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt, 669 F.
Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2009).
207
Id. at 86.
208
Id. at 85.
209
Id. The Nesbitt opinion provides helpful formulas for estimating the
amount of grade-level progress a student forfeited due to a lack of a FAPE. Id.
210
Id. at 86.
211
One disadvantage to this approach is that parents may have to hire
experts to establish a student’s average learning rate and cognitive ability.
Unfortunately, expert witness fees are not recoupable under the IDEA. See Arlington
Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006).
212
See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
213
See supra Part III.B.
206

2011]

MAKING UP FOR LOST EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

1747

administrative hearing officers use the term “additional services”
to denote awards to students who are under twenty-one and still
protected by the IDEA.214 The additional services remedy, while
not fully developed, has taken the form of tutoring services,215
make-up counseling services,216 and home instruction.217
Courts that award additional services to remedy denials
of FAPE generally do so under the guise of awarding a
compensatory education remedy.218 Although the courts have
not distinguished between compensatory education and
additional services, the New York State Review Officer (SRO)
has drawn a distinction between the two types of remedies.219
The SRO has explained the difference between compensatory
education and additional services as follows:
While compensatory education is a remedy that is available to
students who are no longer eligible for instruction, State Review
Officers have awarded “additional services” to students who remain
eligible to attend school and have been denied appropriate services,
if such deprivation of instruction could be remedied through the
provision of additional services before the student becomes ineligible
for instruction by reason of age or graduation.220

Although some commentators have criticized the distinction
between compensatory education and additional services as
“arbitrary,”221 the distinction could serve some practical
214

See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11
(N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08072.pdf. (distinguishing compensatory education from additional services).
215
Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-035, 13 (N.Y.
State Educ. Dep’t Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09035.pdf (awarding one-to-one multi-sensory reading instruction as additional services).
216
Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-044, 21 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t June 25, 2009), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-044.pdf
(awarding additional counseling sessions to compensate for sessions not provided).
217
Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-035, 24 (N.Y.
State Educ. Dep’t June 20, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08035.pdf (awarding ten months of home instruction as additional services).
218
See, e.g., P. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111,
123 (2d Cir. 2008) (awarding compensatory education to a student under twenty-one);
Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 4890440, at *24
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (same).
219
See Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-057, 7 (N.Y.
State Educ. Dep’t Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2010/10057.pdf; see also Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y.
State Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf.
220
Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf.
221
H. Jeffery Marcus, 2008 Special Education Law Update, 188 PLI/NY 213,
225 (May 6, 2009) (arguing that the Student X decision “should help to reinforce that the
SRO’s arbitrary distinction between ‘additional services’ and compensatory education
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purposes. Some courts have been operating under the
assumption that compensatory education can only be awarded
when the student would otherwise not be eligible for
educational services.222 In Manchester School District v.
Christopher B., the United States District Court for the District
of New Hampshire explained that after thoroughly reviewing
the compensatory education case law, it had determined that
compensatory education had only been awarded in two
circumstances.223 According to Christopher B., there are only
two instances when compensatory education can be awarded:
(1) when the student is no longer eligible for services under the
IDEA or (2) during summer vacation.224 The court explained
that “[t]he unifying principle behind the two forms of
compensatory education is that both involve the provision of
education services during time periods in which the local
educational authority is not already obligated to provide the
student a free appropriate education.”225
This limited view of the availability of compensatory
education is understandable given the definition of
“compensatory education” that the courts have developed. For
example, the Third Circuit has defined compensatory education
as an award that “requires a school district to provide education
past a child’s twenty-first birthday to make up for any earlier
deprivation.”226 In a footnote to this definition, the Third Circuit
recognized that compensatory education had also been awarded
during the summer, instead of after the student’s twenty-first
birthday.227 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has described
compensatory education as “a judicially-constructed form of
should be relegated to historical artifact”). Despite the Student X decision, the New York
SRO continues to apply the distinction between compensatory education and additional
services. See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-057, 7 (N.Y.
State Educ. Dep’t Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2010/10-057.pdf
(recognizing that Student X allows for compensatory education awards to students under
the age twenty-one, but still distinguishing additional services).
222
See Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860, 868-69
(D.N.H. 1992).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 869; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F. Supp. 2d
862, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1998), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E.,
207 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A court award of compensatory education requires a
school district to provide education either during the summer months or past a child’s
twenty-first birthday to make up for any earlier deprivation.” (citing M.C. ex rel. J.C. v.
Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir. 1996))).
226
M.C. ex rel. J.C., 81 F.3d at 395.
227
Id. at 395 n.3.
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relief designed to remedy past educational failings for students
who are no longer enrolled in public school due to their age or
graduation.”228 Without clarification from Congress or the courts,
this confusion is likely to continue into the future.
IV.

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: AVOIDING CONFUSION BY
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN FORMS OF RELIEF

The confusion over whether compensatory education can
be awarded to a school-age student who is still protected by the
IDEA could be alleviated by simply distinguishing between the
two types of compensatory educational services. To remedy
denials of FAPE, courts and administrative hearing officers
should award “compensatory education” to students no longer
covered by the IDEA, while awarding “additional services” to
students still falling under the IDEA’s protections. The failure
to distinguish compensatory education from additional services
has also led to confusion over what standards courts should
apply when analyzing compensatory awards, especially in the
Second Circuit.229 This part uses the Second Circuit’s “gross
violation” standard as an example of the extent of the confusion
caused by the current application of the IDEA, and proposes
solutions to prevent such confusion and to help craft better
remedies for disabled students.
A.

Adding to the Confusion: The Second Circuit’s “Gross
Violation” Standard

The Second Circuit has formulated a “gross violation”
standard, which it applies to compensatory education cases.230
Under the standard, compensatory education is unavailable to
a “claimant over the age of twenty-one in the absence of ‘gross’
procedural violations.”231 The Second Circuit’s “gross violation”
standard originated in the case Burr v. Ambach.232 In Burr, the
student sought one and one-half years of compensatory
education beyond age twenty-one to make up for services that
228

Barnett v. Memphis City Schs., 113 Fed. Appx. 124, 126 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993)).
229
See, e.g., Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL
4890440, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
230
See, e.g., Garro v. Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994).
231
Id.
232
Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. Sobol v.
Burr, 422 U.S. 902 (1989), reaff’d, Burr v. Sobol, 888 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1989).
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were not provided to him during a lengthy hearing and appeal
process.233 Since the regulations required the hearing officer to
make a determination within forty-five days of a request and
the decision took over a year, the court found that the federal
regulations had been “grossly violated” and awarded the
student compensatory education.234
Two years later, the Second Circuit applied the “gross
violation” standard in Mrs. C. v. Wheaton.235 In Mrs. C., the
State of Connecticut discharged a twenty-year-old student with
intellectual disabilities from his educational placement without
providing any notice to his mother, who was not given the
chance to participate in the termination decision.236 Mrs. C.
challenged the termination decision and sought compensatory
education, but a Connecticut hearing officer found that the
student had consented to the termination, and thus denied
relief.237 The district court affirmed the decision, finding that a
student over the age of eighteen can voluntarily consent to the
termination of his educational placement.238 The Second Circuit
reversed, finding that the IDEA’s procedural safeguards
require parental notice before any proposed change of
placement, even if the child has reached the age of majority.239
Turning to the compensatory education claim, the Mrs. C.
court cited Burr for the proposition that compensatory education
is proper when the IDEA regulations have been “grossly
violated.”240 The court then highlighted the fact that the “gross
violations” in Burr “resulted in exclusion of the student from
school for a substantial period of time.”241 By comparison to the
violations in Burr, the Mrs. C. court concluded that the student in
question had properly stated a claim for compensatory education
because the state’s procedural violations had resulted in his
“complete exclusion from an educational placement.”242
The Second Circuit, in Garro v. Connecticut, again
applied the “gross violation” standard to dismiss a request for

233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1075.
Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
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compensatory education.243 Garro arose in the context of a
challenge to a hearing officer’s determination that a student
was not eligible for special education.244 Without detailing the
facts of the case, the Garro court simply stated that Garro, who
was over twenty-one, had merely alleged “unspecified
procedural violations of the IDEA.”245 The court concluded that
Garro was not entitled to compensatory education “in the
absence of ‘gross’ procedural violations.”246
Arguably, the Second Circuit’s “gross violation”
standard is not actually a standard at all, but merely a method
of characterizing the facts of those cases.247 Regardless, both the
Second Circuit and other courts have recognized the “gross
violation” standard as the applicable rule in the Second Circuit
for compensatory education cases.248 For example, the Third
Circuit, in M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Regional School District,
explicitly rejected the Second Circuit’s “gross violation”
standard, finding that it was “imprecise” and “not anchored in
the structure or text of the IDEA.”249 Furthermore, although the
“gross violation” standard was originally applied in cases of
procedural violations, some courts and commentators have
generalized the Second Circuit’s rule as requiring a “gross
violation of the IDEA.”250
In Student X. v. New York City Department of
Education, the United States District Court for the Eastern
243

Garro v. Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 736.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 737.
247
See Metzger, supra note 199, at 1860 n.111 (“The position of the Second
Circuit is not entirely plain because the reported cases there all deal with egregious
circumstances and it may be that the discussion of gross violations is not meant to
state a threshold, but merely describes the facts presented.”).
248
See, e.g., Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2 (2d Cir.
2008) (“An award of compensatory education is appropriate only for gross violations of
the IDEA.” (citing Garro, 23 F.3d at 737)); M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81
F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The Second Circuit has conditioned an award of
compensatory education on the presence of a ‘gross’ deprivation of the right to free and
appropriate education.” (citing Garro, 23 F.3d at 737; Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69,
75 (2d Cir. 1990))); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 151
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The Second Circuit, however, allows for compensatory education for
a child over twenty-one years where there has been a gross violation of the IDEA.”
(citing Mrs. C., 916 F.2d at 75)).
249
M.C., 81 F.3d at 396.
250
See, e.g., Somoza, 538 F.3d at 109 n.2 (“An award of compensatory
education is appropriate only for gross violations of the IDEA.” (citing Garro, 23 F.3d at
737)); GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 236 n.65 (generalizing the Second Circuit’s
rule as requiring “gross violations of the IDEA”).
244
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District of New York struggled with the application of the
Second Circuit’s “gross violation” standard.251 In Student X, the
student was an eleven-year-old who had been diagnosed with
autism and other health impairments, which resulted in delays
in motor and cognitive skills.252 The parent had spent several
years fighting the school district through the impartial hearing
process over the provision of at-home Applied Behavioral
Analysis (ABA) services for Student X.253 In 2006, the parent
again challenged the student’s IEP, arguing that it was not
“reasonably calculated” to provide Student X with a FAPE.254
While the proceedings were pending, the district stopped
providing Student X with the ABA at-home services.255 Although
the court ultimately decided that the 2006 IEP provided Student
X with a FAPE, it also found that the school district had
wrongfully terminated the at-home ABA services in violation of
the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision.256 The court concluded that
Student X was entitled to compensatory education because the
school district wrongfully denied him the at-home services.257
In making its decision, the court first addressed the
availability of compensatory education for students who are
under twenty-one and still protected by the IDEA.258 The school
district, relying on Burr and Mrs. C., had argued that Student
X was not eligible for compensatory education because he was
under twenty-one.259 The court rejected this argument,
concluding that just because “earlier cases found that courts
may award compensatory education for individuals over age
twenty-one . . . does not preclude such an award for students
251

Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 4890440, at
*24 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
252
Id. at *4.
253
Id.
254
Id. at *1.
255
Id. at *20.
256
Id. The IDEA’s “stay-put” provision provides, inter alia, that:
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section,
unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree,
the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child,
or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent
of the parents, be placed in the public school program until all such
proceedings have been completed.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2010) (detailing the “stay-put”
requirement).
257
Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23.
258
Id. at *24.
259
See id.
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under age twenty-one.”260 Although distinguishing between the
two compensatory remedies, and clarifying that “additional
services” are the appropriate remedy for students under
twenty-one, would eliminate the need for this issue to be
litigated in other courts in the future, the court did not do so.
The Student X court then proceeded to struggle with the
issue of whether the “gross violation” standard should apply in
the context of awards to students under twenty-one.261 The
court concluded—without deciding the issue—that “regardless
of whether a gross violation of the [IDEA] is required to merit
compensatory education, Defendant’s unlawful termination of
Student X’s pendency entitlement is nonetheless such a
violation.”262 The court assumed the “gross violation” standard
applied, but did not pronounce whether it would apply the
standard in the future.263 Expressing concern over the vagueness
of the “gross violation” standard, the Student X court recognized
that the “caselaw on what constitutes a gross violation is
sparse.”264 The court acknowledged that Student X had not been
“completely deprived of all education” by the school district’s
wrongful termination of his at-home ABA services, but found
that the district’s direct violation of the IDEA’s pendency
provision was sufficient to establish a “gross violation.”265 Thus,
while earlier courts required a total deprivation of educational
benefit to establish a “gross violation,”266 later courts have been
willing to find a “gross violation” even when the student was
receiving some educational benefit.
This confusion shows that, in addition to distinguishing
between compensatory education and additional services
awards, the Second Circuit needs to clarify when, if ever, the
“gross violation” standard applies. Arguably, this heightened
standard has been taken out of context over the years by
transplanting it from purely procedural settings into cases
turning on substantive denials of FAPE. Even in the
procedural context, however, the “gross violation” standard
260

Id.
Id. at *24-25.
262
Id. at *24.
263
Id. at *24-25.
264
Id. at *25.
265
Id. (“Defendant ignored the plain language of the statute and regulations
and deprived Student X of services to which Student X was unequivocally entitled
regardless of the merits of his case. The court finds this a gross violation of the [IDEA].”).
266
See Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990); see also supra notes
241-242 and accompanying text.
261
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appears to conflict with the evolving spirit and purpose of the
IDEA.267 While compensatory education cases deserve a more
stringent standard than additional services cases, courts
should not allow school districts to escape liability through a
heightened “gross violation” standard. Instead, given
Congress’s emphasis on procedural safeguards, courts should
adopt a standard that comports with the 2004 IDEA
amendments to assess whether the school district substantially
complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA.268
Even after deciding that Student X was entitled to a
compensatory remedy, the court struggled with the calculation
of an appropriate award.269 Although crafting an award under
the IDEA depends on “equitable considerations,” the Second
Circuit has not articulated a method for computing
compensatory awards.270 In the end, the court decided to award
Student X compensatory relief in a mechanical fashion:
“Defendant is ordered to fund and provide ten hours per week
of at-home ABA and five hours per week of speech and
language therapy, for fifty-seven weeks, the amount of time
that Student X was unlawfully deprived of the services from
March 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008.”271 While this hour-for-hour
approach might work well enough in some cases, often a
student will require more educational hours than he was
originally denied to compensate him for the denial of a FAPE,
especially if the student has regressed due to the school’s
failure.272 Courts could avoid some of these calculation
ambiguities by adopting the IEP-centered FAPE standard for
“additional services” cases273 and the grade-level standard for
“compensatory education” cases.274

267

See supra notes 125-126.
See supra note 98 (providing the text of the 2004 amendment to the IDEA
that addresses procedural violations).
269
Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *26; see also supra notes 203-211 and
accompanying text (discussing the calculation of compensatory awards).
270
Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *26.
271
Id.
272
Furthermore, the hour-for-hour calculation will not be very helpful to
courts when the denial of a FAPE is not due to a school’s failure to provide the student
a particular service, but rather due to an inappropriate placement.
273
See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
274
See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
268
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Summary of Proposals

As the cases applying the Second Circuit’s “gross
violation” standard show, the confusion in the types of relief
under the IDEA and the standards applied to analyze claims
under the IDEA leaves this area of law in disarray. The
consequences of this confusion ultimately falls upon students
with disabilities and their families, who are faced with
uncertain standards and even less certainty in what type of
relief they may be able to obtain.
To address this confusion, courts should begin to
distinguish between these two different forms of relief: (1)
“compensatory education” awards for students over twenty-one,
and (2) “additional services” awards for students still protected
by the IDEA. As long as courts refuse to make this simple
distinction, parents and school districts will continue to take
these cases to the courts, seeking clarification. This distinction
would resolve a lot of uncertainty as to when compensatory
remedies are available to remedy a denial of a FAPE, and
would help move the circuit courts towards consistent
application of appropriate standards.
Most importantly, by distinguishing at the outset of a
case between the two types of compensatory remedies—and
which type was being sought in that particular case—courts
could apply standards that would be more appropriate for
ultimately crafting a remedy. In “additional services” cases
courts should apply the IEP-centered approach for making both
the FAPE determination and for crafting narrower, goalfocused remedies.275 This individually-centered approach would
likely result in more appropriately tailored additional services
awards to students at younger ages when the services will be
more effective. The IEP approach would also encourage schools
to focus more seriously on the measurable goal-setting
requirements of the IDEA.276
In “compensatory education” cases, however, courts
should apply the heightened “meaningful benefit” standard
that evolved from Rowley to determine whether a student was
provided with a FAPE.277 If the court finds that the student was
denied a FAPE, it should then use the grade-level approach to
calculate a more holistic remedy that allows the student to
275
276
277

See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
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make up the grade-level benefits she lost due to the denial of a
FAPE.278 This broader approach is necessary for students who
are aging out of the IDEA’s coverage because a compensatory
education award will likely be the student’s last chance to
receive a publicly funded FAPE.
Finally, courts should not adopt the Second Circuit’s
“gross violation” standard for either compensatory education or
additional service determinations.279 Although it originated in
the context of purely procedural violations, there is the risk
that courts will mistakenly apply the overly restrictive
standard to all compensatory education cases, even those
turning on substantive denials of a FAPE.280 Even in the case of
purely procedural violations, however, the standard arguably
conflicts with Congress’s increased emphasis on the IDEA’s
procedural mandates.281 Instead of the “gross violation”
standard, courts should apply the standard Congress adopted
in the 2004 amendments to the IDEA to determine when
procedural violations amount to a denial of a FAPE.282
CONCLUSION
Without clarification from the courts or from Congress,
school districts and parents will continue to litigate compensatory
educational services cases. By treating “compensatory education”
and “additional services” as distinct remedies, administrative
hearing officers and courts can make better FAPE determinations
and also calculate more meaningful awards. Just as the
standards for tuition reimbursement have evolved over time, it is
time for the courts to advance clearer standards in compensatory
education and additional services cases.
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